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Abstract
We analyze the implications of the time inconsistency problem for
the Turkish monetary policy in the last two decades. After deriving the
restrictions that the Barro and Gordon model imposes on a time series
model for inﬂation and output, we show that the time inconsistency prob-
lem can explain both the short-run and the long-run behaviour of inﬂation
and output in the Turkish economy. The results also reveal that the Turk-
ish monetary policymakers have put more emphasis on output stability
than price stability in the last decade.
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Following the seminal papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), time inconsistency problem has received considerable attention
in the macroeconomics literature. The idea is simple in terms of monetary
policy: the policymaker designs and announces a policy at the beginning of
each period. However, mostly due to political incentives and negative supply
shocks, the policymaker follows a discretionary monetary policy and attempts
to increase the output by creating surprise inﬂation. Yet, consistent with the
Lucas’ Critique, once this discretionary motive is anticipated by the agents in
the economy, prices and wages will be adjusted accordingly, and the result will
be an increase in price level with no output gain.
On the other hand, the idea has also been the target of criticisms. Blinder
(1998) argues that the central bankers, who are the practitioners of monetary
policy, never once witnessed nor experienced a temptation to reach for short-
term output (or unemployment) gains by creating surprise inﬂation. He also
suggests that the time inconsistency problem is purely a theoretical problem
because policymakers have found practical ways to solve it. Moreover, Taylor
(1997) argues that the behavior of inﬂation in the United States is not at-
tributable to the time inconsistency problem and also adds that the Barro and
Gordon model does not ﬁt with the European experience.
In the last decade, many theoretical studies have been made within the
context of time inconsistency problem. However, these studies stopped short of
1exploring whether time inconsistency problem can explain the output-inﬂation
(or unemployment-inﬂation) relationship for both industrialized and developing
countries. As an exception, Ireland (1999) derived the restrictions imposed by
Barro and Gordon’s theory of time inconsistent monetary policy for inﬂation and
unemployment and tested those restrictions using quarterly United States data.
He found that time inconsistency problem can explain the long-run behavior of
inﬂation and unemployment. However, his model is less successful to account
for the short-run dynamics between these two variables.
In this study, we modify Ireland’s model and apply it to the Turkish economy.
We have three main reasons for this motivation. First, unlike other European
countries, Turkey has experienced a persistent inﬂationary environment with
co-movement of inﬂation and unemployment in the last decade. Second, the
political instability in the country resulted in frequent election periods which
gave policymakers the incentive to create surprise inﬂation and boost output
before the election periods. Finally, the literature on the Turkish inﬂation is
mostly dominated by empirical studies without much theoretical background.
Therefore, a study, relying on a theoretical model with empirical ﬁndings will
p r o v i d es o m ei n s i g h t f u lr e s u l t s .
As a result, taking these factors as our starting point, we analyze the impli-
cations of the time inconsistency problem for the Turkish economy in the last
two decades. Such an approach will also broaden our understanding of the inﬂa-
tion dynamics in Turkey, which has been the most problematic macroeconomic
variable of the last few decades. Moreover, such a model has potential for ap-
2plications to other emerging markets, which are also characterized by persistent
inﬂation along with ﬁscal dominance in the policymaking process.
The following section presents a literature review on the inﬂation dynamics
of the Turkish economy and summarize the characteristics of Turkish monetary
policy in the last two decades. Next, the model is introduced. Then, the
estimation and test results along with their implications are displayed for both
short-run and long-run. In light of these results, policy proposals along with
some recent attempts to increase the credibility of Turkish monetary policy are
discussed. We oﬀer conclusion in the last section.
2 Persistent Inﬂation Problem: The Case of Turkey
2.1 Characteristics of Turkish Monetary Policy, 1980-2000
Between 1980 and 1986, the monetary policy was totally dependent on the ﬁscal
side. As an important sign of ﬁscal dominance, the public sector’s borrowing
requirement was met through the Central Bank resources. Although some im-
portant steps were taken to prevent the subordination of monetary policy to
ﬁscal policy after 1986, these attempts failed to increase the eﬀectiveness of
Central Bank policies to control inﬂation. One important factor for this failure
was the exposition of the economy to massive short-term capital ﬂows begin-
ning with the capital account liberalization in the early 1990s. The high level
of dollarization as a result of this liberalization shifted the Central Bank’s main
role from controlling inﬂation to providing stability in the ﬁnancial markets.
Also, frequent election periods combined with political instability put further
3pressure on the monetary policy. Finally, in line with the stabilization policies,
one of the main roles of the Central Bank was to maintain the stability of the
real exchange rate, which further limited the scopes of the monetary policy.
2.2 Literature Review on Inﬂa t i o ni nT u r k i s hE c o n o m y
Inﬂation has become a persistent problem for the Turkish economy for more
than two decades1. However, the dynamics of pre-1980 and post-1980 inﬂa-
tion must be analyzed separately mainly because Turkey experienced a radical
structural change in the 1980s2. Most of the studies focus exclusively on the
post-1980 period while only a few studies analyze the pre-1980 period. Aksoy
(1982) and Ertugrul (1982) ﬁnd that inﬂationary expectations played crucial
role in determining inﬂation in the pre-1980 period. Also, the nature of foreign
exchange availability, fast domestic credit expansion are among the other factors
that shaped the inﬂation dynamics.
T h e r ei sav a s tl i t e r a t u r ea b o u tt h es o u r c e so fi n ﬂation in the post-1980
period. Yeldan (1993), Metin (1995, 1998) ﬁnd evidence that supports demand-
pull inﬂation. Kibritcioglu and Kibritcioglu (1999) looks at the supply side
and ﬁnd that changes in oil prices are negligible in aﬀecting inﬂation, which is
contrary to the common belief.
Some studies like Selcuk (2001), Scacciavillani (1995) and Akcay, Alper and
Karasulu (1997) investigate the eﬀects of currency substitution on macroeco-
nomic variables, including inﬂation. A high degree of currency substitution
1For a detailed literature review, see Kibritcioglu (2001).
2See Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001) for a detailed analysis.
4lowers the ability of the government to generate seignorage revenue and increases
the importance of credibility in the policymaking process. While Scacciavillani
(1995) reports a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship between inﬂation rate and
currency substitution, Selcuk (2001) argues that currency substitution has the
potential to reduce the seignorage revenue of the government.
Many studies, including Lim and Papi (1997), Agenor and Hoﬀmaister (1997),
Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan (1999), and Baum et al. (1999) reported the im-
portance of inertia in inﬂation dynamics. Erlat (2001) also ﬁnds that inﬂation
has a signiﬁcant long memory component.
There are two important factors, which the above mentioned studies did not
take fully take into account. First, most of these studies are empirical. Sev-
eral time-series techniques, preferably Vector Autoregression (VAR) models, are
employed with diﬀerent data sets to derive conclusions. Although these stud-
ies provide insightful results, there is still room for studies with a theoretical
background. Second, political incentives, the role of institutions and preferences
of the policymakers are often ignored while investigating inﬂation dynamics in
Turkey3. That is, the factors, which play key roles in the “new political macroe-
conomics” are not considered in these empirical studies. Per contra, our model
presented below is designed to capture such factors. In particular , the time
inconsistency framework gives us an idea about the preferences of the policy-
maker between price stability and output stability. It may reveal whether the
policymakers can exploit an expectational Phillips curve. More importantly,
3One exception is Ergun (2000), who analyzes the implications of political business cycles
and frequent election periods.
5we can ﬁnd out whether the discretionary motives of the policymakers are fully
anticipated by the agents in the economy. The new classical framework suggests
that the policy credibility and reputation are two essential features of success-
fully disinﬂating the economy. Then, we can test whether the Turkish monetary
policy has these two characteristics to follow a credible macroeconomic program.
Therefore, we believe that, employing a testable theory of inﬂation, which in-
cludes all of these motives mentioned above, will oﬀer a positive contribution to
the literature.
3 The Model
As noted in the introduction, the model is based on Ireland (1999) which is a
modiﬁed version of the Barro and Gordon’s study. There is an expectational
Phillips Curve which can be written as:
yt = y∗
t + α(πt − πe
t) (1)
where yt i st h ea c t u a ll o gl e v e lo fo u t p u ta tt i m eta n dy ∗
t is the potential level
of output. πt is the actual inﬂation rate at time t while πe
t is the expected
inﬂation. Moreover, the change in the potential level of output is assumed to







t−1 (i.e. the change in the potential level of output),
0≤ λ ≤ 1,a n dεt is assumed to be serially correlated and normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation σε.
One important component of the time inconsistency problem is that the
monetary authority can not commit to a policy rule. At each period, after
the agents set their expectations about inﬂation, πe
t, but before the real shock
εt is realized, the policymaker chooses a planned rate of inﬂation, π
p
t.A c t u a l
inﬂation πt is assumed to be the sum of planned inﬂation, π
p




t + ηt (3)
where ηt is assumed to be serially correlated and normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation ση.
At each period, the policymaker minimizes a loss function of the form:
Lt =( 1 /2)(yt − ky∗
t)2 +( b/2)π2
t
where k is assumed to be greater than unity and b denotes the relative weight
that the policymaker puts on price stability. Therefore, estimation of b will
reveal the policymaker’s preference between output and price stability.
The loss function penalizes the deviations of πt and yt from their target
values which are zero and kyt, respectively. One reason that the policymaker
wants to stabilize output above its potential level can be the market distortions
7that keep the potential output below the socially optimal level. Also, the pol-
icymaker may want to hold actual output above the potential output due to
political incentives or electoral purposes.
Such a loss function formulation is commonly used in studies that views
Central Banks as policymakers which solve an optimization problem to achieve
a socially optimum outcome. A recent example is Geraats (2002).













by substituting equations 1 and 3 into the loss function.




t + ηt − πe
t)+bEt−1(π
p
t + ηt)=0 (4)
Another important component of the time inconsistency problem is that the
agents in the economy fully anticipate the discretionary action of the policy-
maker, and therefore set πe
t equal to π
p
t. Using this condition along with the
fact that the control error ηt c a nn o tb ek n o w na tt i m et − 1 (i.e. Et−1ηt =0 ),






8H e r e ,i tm u s tb en o t e dt h a tt h e r ei sa ni n ﬂationary bias which depends posi-
tively on the potential level of output since the expression to the left of potential
output is greater than zero. Later on, in the empirical part, this theoretical re-
striction will be tested for the real life data. Another interesting result can be
obtained by observing the parameter k.A sn o t e db e f o r e ,k represents the poli-
cymaker’s desire to hold actual output above the level of potential output due
to electoral purposes or market distortions. The closer is k to unity, the less will
b et h ed e s i r et oh a v ee x c e s so u t p u ta n dt h el e s sw i l lb et h ee x p e c t e di n ﬂation.
Thus, if the agents in the economy anticipate that the policymaker has a strong
desire to boost output by creating surprise inﬂation, the equilibrium level of
inﬂation will be too high.
A similar result can be derived by observing the parameter b.I n t h e l o s s
function, b represents the relative weight that the policymaker assigns to price
stability. The higher b, the lower will be the equilibrium level of inﬂation.
U s i n ge q u a t i o n s1a n d3a sw e l la st h ef a c tt h a tπ
p
t = πe
t ,w ec a ns e et h a t :
yt = y∗
t + αηt (6)
This implies that actual output ﬂuctuates around potential output because




t−1 + εt + αηt (7)
9Equation 7 indicates that output is nonstationary.
In addition, we can ﬁnd a formula for inﬂation in terms of potential level
output and the disturbance terms by combining equations 2, 3 and 5:
πt =[ α(k − 1)/b]y∗
t−1 +[ αλ(k − 1)/b]∆y∗
t−1 + ηt (8)
Equation 8 indicates that inﬂation is also nonstationary.
If we can show that a stationary linear combination between ytand πt exists,
this will imply a long-run equilibrium relationship between these two variables
(i.e. they are cointegrated). Equation 7 and 8 imply that:
πt +[ α(1 − k)/b]yt =[ α(1 − k)/b]εt +[ 1+α2(1 − k)/b]ηt (9)
Equation 9 is a stationary linear combination of output and inﬂation. There-
fore, it summarizes the constraint that time inconsistency problem imposes on
the long-run behavior of output and inﬂation. If this implication is supported
by cointegration tests, then we can say that time-inconsistency problem can
explain the co-movement of inﬂation and output for Turkish economy in the
long-run.
In order to evaluate the short-run dynamics of the model, let us take the
ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation 6:
∆yt = ∆y∗
t + αηt − αηt−1 (10)
10Substituting equation 10 into equation 2 will lead to:
∆yt = λ∆yt−1 + εt + αηt − α(1 + λ)ηt−1 + αληt−2 (11)
Equations 9 and 11 together indicate that, the model represents an ARMA(1,2)
model, which can be written in state space form, and its parameters can be es-
timated by using Kalman Filter as suggested by Hamilton (1994).
The empirical validity of the model will be discussed below. However, the
model can also be criticized on theoretical grounds for not considering the open
economy dynamics. Exchange rate dynamics and inﬂation are found to be
closely related4 for Turkish economy. However, as Rittenberg (1993) argues,
the causality runs from price level changes to exchange rate changes. Also,
Metin (1998) ﬁnds that a closed economy model encompasses the one with open
economy dynamics. Therefore, it can be argued that the model presented above
is valid on theoretical basis.
4 Estimation and Testing
This section is divided into two parts. First, the short-run dynamics will be
analyzed. The parameters of the model will be estimated within this respect.
Next, the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship imposed by the time
inconsistency problem will be tested.
The data set consists of monthly observations in the sample period 1980:01-
4See Insel (1995), Erol and van Wijnbergen (1997), Lim and Papi (1997), Agenor and Hoﬀ-
maister (1997), Darrat (1997) and Akyurek (1999) for the inﬂationary eﬀects of depreciations.
112001:12. π is the monthly consumer price inﬂation and y is the logarithm of the
industrial production index. Both series are seasonally adjusted and obtained
from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s data base.
4.1 Short-Run Dynamics
Equations (9) and (11) can be conveniently written in state space form and the
parameters can be estimated via Kalman Filter, as shown in Appendix 1.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 1
along with their standard errors. The standard errors are computed by taking
square roots of the diagonal elements of the inverse of the information matrix.
For identiﬁcation purposes, A is taken to be equal to (k − 1)/b. Also, the log
likelihood value of the constrained is presented.
Table 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates







Lc =Log Likelihood Value of the Constrained Model = 170.92
The value for α suggests that, one-percentage of surprise inﬂation leads to a
rise in output by 0.11 percentage points, indicating that there is still room for
creating surprise inﬂation but the gain is not much at all.
The value for A is 1.31 and A =( k − 1)/b.W e a s s u m e d t h a t k is greater
than unity. If we set b =1 ,ktakes the value 2.31, which is not possible. Then,
12we can conclude that b should be less than one. In the loss function for the
policymaker, b represented the relative weight that was put on price stability.
Therefore, if b<1, it suggests that the monetary authority placed more weight
on its goals for output than on its goals for inﬂa t i o ni nt h el a s tt w od e c a d e s .
The restrictions that the model imposes are tested by comparing an unre-
stricted ARMA (1,2) with our restricted ARMA model. The state space form
of the unconstrained model can be seen in Appendix 2. Our constrained model
has 6 parameters while the unrestricted model has 16 parameters. Thus, our
model places 10 restrictions on the model. To test the overall signiﬁcance, we
use a Likelihood Ratio Test which has the statistic 2(Lu −L) under Chi-Square
distribution with 10 degrees of freedom. The likelihood function takes the value
of 170.91 for the restricted model and 174.41 for the unrestricted model. Then
the statistic takes the value of 7 when we apply the likelihood ratio test. The
0.001 critical value for a chi-square random variable with 10 degrees of freedom
is 29.6. Therefore, we see that the restrictions that the Barro-Gordon model
imposes can not be rejected, and the model is signiﬁcant5 in the short-run.
4.2 Long-Run Dynamics
After analyzing the short-run dynamics in the previous subsection, we focus our
interest on a possible long-run equilibrium relationship (cointegration) between
output and inﬂation. Therefore, this subsection tests for unit roots in inﬂation
and output and then for cointegration between these series. If we can show that
a stationary linear combination between the variables of interest exists, this will
5It must be noted that in Ireland (1999), the model was overwhelmingly rejected.
13empirically prove the validity of equation (9) which summarizes the constraint
that the model imposes on the long-run behavior of the two variables. Then,
we can claim that time-inconsistency problem can explain the co-movement of
inﬂation and output for the Turkish economy in the long run. Before testing
for cointegration, we used both graphs and a unit root test to characterize the
data’s properties.
4.2.1 Unit-Root Tests
As mentioned above, the data set consists of monthly observations in the sample
period 1980:01-2001:12. In this section, yc is constructed from equation (9) and
the estimation results in the previous subsection (yc =l o gy ∗ (−1.31 ∗ 0.11)) ,
and it is named as constructed output for the following analysis.
Figures 1-3 show level of constructed output (yc), growth rate of yc,a n d
monthly consumer price inﬂation, respectively. Visually, level of constructed
output series appears to be at least integrated of order one, i.e. I(1),f r o m
ﬁgure 1, while growth rate of yc in ﬁgure 2 seems I(0) and, from its plot, looks
like a stationary heteroscedastic series. From ﬁgure 3, monthly consumer price
inﬂation appears to be I(1), which is validated by the ADF test in Table 2.






-1.01 (12) -2.058 (12)
-6.22 (11)∗∗ -11.466 (10)∗∗
For a given variable and null order, two values are reported in table 2. The
6The critical values are from MacKinnon (1991, Table 1). Here and elsewhere in this paper,
(∗∗) and (∗) denote rejection at the 1% and 5% critical values, respectively.
14ﬁrst one is the t value which is the ADF statistic and the second one, which is
given in the paranthesis, is the longest signiﬁcant lag with a signiﬁcant t value.
13 lags are allowed in log(yc) and π’s ADF regression. All regressions include a
constant term. A trend is allowed only for log(yc)’s ADF regression for the I(1)
null order. The results show that the ADF test statistics in Table 2 support the
graphical explanation.
4.2.2 Cointegration Analysis
Having used the multivariate cointegration procedure in Johansen (1988) and
Johansen and Juselius (1990), we test for cointegration in a vector autoregression
model (VAR). The VAR only includes a constant term. Figure 4 captures the
essence of the cointegration analysis: both monthly consumer price inﬂation
and the level of constructed output show almost similar behavior except for
1994 ﬁnancial crises during which price level increased by almost 164 percent. To
capture the co-movement among the variable of interest and 1994 ﬁnancial crises,
we added a dummy variable. It should also be noted that the constructed output
series displays a negative pattern since the actual output series is multiplied by
α(1 − k)/b, which takes a negative value.
The cointegration results are quite sensitive to the lag length of the VAR.
Our choice of four lags is based on the (Schwarz) Bayesian information criteria
(BIC), of which pointed to the 13 lags. Table 3 presents the cointegration
results.
15Table 3. Cointegration Analysis
E-Value Likelihood Ratio 5% c.v. 1% c.v. Hypothesized # of C.E(s)
0.102 31.52 24.31 29.75 None
0.066 13.43 12.53 16.31 At most 1
0.011 1.87 3.84 6.51 At most 2







Table 3 summarizes the cointegration results. It includes the eigenvalues,
the likelihood ratio statistics and cointegrating vector β
0
. The standard devi-
ations of corresponding β parameters are given in the parenthesis. Likelihood
ratio test statistic indicates one cointegrating equation between yc and π at 1%
signiﬁcance level. The cointegrating relationship (yc = −0.26π+8.79∗Dummy)
suggests that inﬂation bias is positively related to output, which is consistent
with the time inconsistency theory. Also, the validity of the restrictions in equa-
tion (5) can be tested by using the Likelihood Ratio test statistic. The statistic
gives a value of 0.40, which is less than the chi-square critical value with one de-
grees of freedom. Therefore, the hypothesis of a one-to-one relationship between
the constructed output and inﬂation can not be rejected.
As a result, we ﬁnd that, the discretionary incentives of the policymakers are
perceived by the agents and built upon expectations. Therefore in the long-run,
the relationship between inﬂation and output turns out to be negative. Behind
these results, there are some policy implications, which are discussed next.
4.3 Discussion of the Results and Policy Proposals
The above results indicate that the policymakers’ attempts to create surprise
inﬂation result in a loss of credibility in the policymaking process, which also
16distorts the long-run disinﬂation and stabilization programs. The factors that
derived these results should be analyzed thoroughly. As mentioned above, the
Turkish monetary policy in the last two decades were under ﬁscal dominance.
Public sector’s borrowing requirements put a heavy burden on the Central bank
side. Also, the massive capital ﬂows as a result of capital account liberalization
during this period led the Central Bank to focus exclusively on the stability of
the ﬁnancial markets and real exchange rates. Moreover, as claimed by Ergun
(2000) and Berument (1997), frequency of elections and existence of coalition
governments combined with the low level of Central Bank independence, pushed
the governments to adopt populist policies that resulted in ﬁscal expansion.
Therefore, it should not be surprising to ﬁnd that agents in the economy take
these persistent inﬂationary factors into account and form their price and wage
expectations accordingly.
Then, what kind policies should be followed to eliminate the inﬂationary bias
and achieve price stability? As discussed in Geraats (2002), there are mainly ﬁve
solutions. First, the central bank can give up employing discretionary policies
and commit to a policy rule. Second, consistent with Rogoﬀ (1985), a “conser-
vative” central banker, who will put more emphasis on price stability than any
other objectives can be appointed. Third, incentive contracts can be designed
to bind the actions of the central bank. Fourth, a lower turnover rate of central
bank governors and a longer terms of oﬃce will likely to improve the reputation
of the policymakers. Finally, transparency about both objectives and operations
of central banks, which is a key element of the inﬂation targeting regimes, will
17remove the uncertainty during the policymaking process.
After presenting the solutions to reduce the inﬂation bias and eliminate the
time inconsistency problem, we should also discuss the institutional reforms
undertaken in Turkey, especially after the severe ﬁnancial crisis in February
2001. With the new law passed in April 2001, the primary objective of the
Central Bank is stated as to achieve and maintain price stability. Also, to
remove ﬁscal dominance, the Central Bank was prohibited to grant advance
a n de x t e n dc r e d i tt ob o t hT r e a s u r ya n dother public institutions. Moreover,
purchasing debt instruments issued by the Treasury was also prohibited. For
reputation considerations, terms of oﬃce of vice governors were extended and
the new law stated that the governors can not be ﬁred before their terms expire.
Finally, to increase the degree of transparency and accountability, oﬃcial reports
about the objectives and operations of the Central Bank began to be regularly
published. As a result, it is not wrong to say that the monetary policymakers
became aware of the time inconsistency problem and the associated inﬂation
bias, which dominated the economy in the last two decades. However, there are
some recent promising steps taken towards more independent, transparent and
accountable central banks, which are likely to remove this inﬂation bias in the
Turkish economy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Time-inconsistent monetary policy implies that, in the absence of any com-
mitment technology for the monetary authority, the policymaker may want to
18exploit a Phillips Curve by creating surprise inﬂation. However, this discre-
tionary behaviour is anticipated by the agents in the economy who adjust prices
and wages accordingly. Therefore, the policymaker will not be able to create
surprise inﬂation and the result will be an increase in inﬂation with output
unchanged.
Although many studies have been produced about time inconsistency prob-
lem on theoretical grounds, the problem was analyzed empirically only by Ire-
land (1999). However, time inconsistency problem, which can also be viewed
as a credibility problem for the monetary policy, has broad implications, es-
pecially for developing economies that have persistent inﬂation problems along
with ﬁscal dominance. Therefore, we take this argument as our starting point
and analyze the implications of the time inconsistency problem for the Turkish
economy within the last two decades. The Turkish case is interesting because
unlike other European economies, the Turkish economy is characterized to have
ap e r s i s t e n ti n ﬂation problem for more than two decades. Also, there were fre-
quent election periods which may have caused incentives to boost the economy
by creating surprise inﬂation.
The results presented in this paper suggest that, time inconsistency problem
applies for Turkey, both in the short-run and the long-run. The restrictions that
are imposed by the Barro and Gordon model can not be rejected. Therefore,
we can conclude that the discretionary behaviors of the policymakers are antici-
pated by the agents in the economy and are reﬂected in price and wage settings.
Such a ﬁnding has the potential to explain the persistent inﬂation problem in
19the Turkish economy.Another important result is that, the policymakers have
put more emphasis on output stability than price stability in the last decade.
A c c o r d i n gt oR o g o ﬀ (1985), this is not a socially optimum outcome in the sense
that, it is always good for the society to appoint a policymaker who is known to
be more conservative about price stability. Therefore, based on this idea, it can
also be argued that the Turkish policymakers did not follow a socially optimum
policy in the last two decades.
There is a policy proposal implied by these empirical ﬁndings: the policy-
makers should not attempt to stabilize output through exploiting an expecta-
tional Phillips curve since it leads to an increase in inﬂation with almost no
ouput gain. More importantly, such a behavior undermines the credibility of
t h em o n e t a r yp o l i c y . O n ew a yt os o l v et h i si s s u ei st oi n t r o d u c ec o m m i t m e n t
technologies, which would induce the policymaker to commit to a policy rule
or to a pre-speciﬁed target. Other possible solutions include appointing “con-
servative” central bankers, designing incentive contracts, extending the terms
of oﬃces of the governors and being transparent and accountable about the fol-
lowed policies. The recent institutional reforms that take these proposals into
account seem promising within this context.
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247 Appendix: State Space Representation
As explained in Hamilton (1994), the idea behind State Space Models is to ex-
press a dynamic system in a particular form called State Space Representation.
The Kalman Filtering is an algorithm for sequentially updating a linear projec-
tion for the system. In this appendix, the state space representation for both
the restricted model and the unrestricted model is presented.
7.1 Appendix 1. The Restricted Model
Let yt denote an n ∗ 1 vector of observed variables at time t.D y n a m i cm o d e l s
can be described in terms of unobserved vector ζt which is known as the state
vector. The state space representation of the dynamics of yt can be written as:
ζt = Fζt−1 + vt
yt = Bxt + HTζt + wt
where F, B,a n dH are matrices of parameters. xt is a vector of exogenous
or predetermined variables. The ﬁrst equation is known as the state equation
and the second one is observation equation.
If we rewrite equations (9) and (10):
πt +[ α(1 − k)/b]yt =[ α(1 − k)/b]εt +[ 1+α2(1 − k)/b]ηt (1)
∆yt = ∆y∗
t + αηt − αηt−1 (2)
25We can see that the observed variables vector (yt in the observation equation)
will be:
·
πt +[ α(1 − k)/b]yt
∆yt
¸
which is a 2*1 vector.







































On the other hand, the observation equation can be written as:
·









As noted above Kalman Filtering is an algorithm for sequentially updating
a linear projection for the system. Conditional on {yt−1,y t−2,....,y1}, yt is nor-
mally distributed with mean Hξt|t−1 and variance HPt|t−1H
0
,w h e r eHζt|t−1and
HPt|t−1H
0
can be constructed recursively. The initial conditions are ζ1|0 =0 4∗1
and vec(P1|0)=[ I16∗16 − F ⊗ F]−1vec(QΣQ
0
).






ζt+1|t = Fζt|t−1 + Kt(yt − Hζt|t−1)








for t =1 ,2,...,t − 1. The log-likelihood function can be written as:












In order to estimate the parameters of the model, initial values for the pa-
rameters α,A,λ,σε,ση,σεη are chosen. The parameter estimates, their standard
errors and the value for the Log Likelihood function can be seen in Table 1.
7.2 Appendix 2. Unrestricted Model
To test the overall signiﬁcance of the model, an unrestricted model which con-





















































































Thus, the model has 16 parameters to estimate. After putting the model
into state space form and applying Kalman Filter, we ﬁnd that the likelihood
function takes the value of 174.41 for the unrestricted model. Then, to test
the overall signiﬁcance, we use a Likelihood Ratio Test which has the statistic
2(Lu − L) under Chi-Square distribution with 10 degrees of freedom.
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 Figure 4 Monthly consumer price inflation 
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